Academic

Perdue on Administrative Accountability & TARP

By Lawrence Solum

William Perdue (Yale University - Law School) has posted Administering Crisis: The Success of Alternative Accountability Mechanisms in the Capital Purchase Program (Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2011) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The popular and scholarly consensus on TARP holds that it is a paradigmatic case of the administrative state run a muck. This study of the Capital Purchase Program, however, shows that, despite the absence of specific statutory commands or any judicial review, the first and largest sub-program of TARP operated in accordance with the basic requirements of the rule of law and core values of administrative governance ? that is, effective administration, protection of the legal rights of regulated entities, and facilitation of democratic control. This success was due to alternative mechanisms for holding administrators to account, specifically, the hierarchical bureaucratic structures established to run the program and the fact that the program involved voluntary transactions rather than coercive regulation.

An interesting student note.

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on March 24, 2011 (boomark / email).