ADVERTISEMENT



Google       

Home -> Law Blog Directory -> Appellate Law Blogs -> Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

OR PHONE (866) 635-1838 for Bankruptcy Help, (866) 635-6190 for Divorce,
(866) 635-2689 for Personal Injury or (866) 635-9402 for Criminal Defense

Find a Local Lawyer

Bankruptcy (866) 635-1838
Divorce (866) 635-6190
Personal Injury (866) 635-2689
Criminal Defense (866) 635-9402

Bookmark

Appellate Law

: Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

Bank?s Petition To Vacate Default Judgment Untimely But Court Hears Appeal Anyway

By Steven R. Merican

ADVERTISEMENTS

In this confusing mortgage foreclosure case, a default judgment was entered in favor of Washington Mutual Bank against Archer Bank. About six months later, Archer asked the court to vacate the default. Archer?s motion to vacate relied on two sections of the Illinois Civil Procedure Code ? § 2-1301(e) (setting aside default judgments); § 2-1401 (relief from judgments).

The trial court denied Archer?s motion to vacate. Eventually, a final and appealable order distributing the proceeds of the sale of the property was entered. Archer appealed and argued that the default should have been vacated under § 2-1401. In the appellate court, Archer dropped its § 2-1301(e) argument.

Appeals from § 2-1401 petitions are governed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b). The rule requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days. Although Archer filed an appeal within 30 days of the final distribution order, it came long after the court ruled on the § 2-1401 petition.

We have no doubt that Archer's notice of appeal gives us jurisdiction to review the outcome of the foreclosure case. But Archer's brief complains only of the trial court's dismissal of Archer's request to vacate the default in that request's aspect as a section 2--1401 petition. Under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) ? an order resolving a section 2--1401 petition is immediately appealable. When rule 304(b) makes an order immediately appealable, that appeal is not elective--any claim of error is lost if not raised then ? Indeed, because a section 2--1401 petition begins a separate action ? the resolution of the petition ends the entire action, so no other time to appeal could exist.

But Archer got another bite at the apple anyway. The appellate court ruled that Archer?s § 2-1301 petition became reviewable after the final distribution order was entered, so Archer?s appeal was timely. And although Archer did not brief its § 2-1301 argument, the Second District Illinois Appellate Court took the case on that basis anyway. In the end, the appellate court sent the case back to the trial court to consider Archer?s § 2-1301 petition.

Read the whole opinion, Washington Mutual Bank v. Archer Bank, No. 2-07-0074 (9/15/08), by clicking here.

Full post as published by Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog on December 11, 2008 (boomark / email).

Bloggers, promote your law blog by nominating your blog for inclusion in USLaw.com's Law Blog Directory and RSS Reader. Benefits described.
Related Law Articles

Lawsuits and Settlements

Related Searches

























































































































US Law
#1 Online Legal Resource













Your Blog Subscriptions
Subscribe to blogs

10,000+ Law Job Listings
Lawyer . Police . Paralegal . Etc
Earn a law-related degree
Are you the author of this blog? Adding USLaw.com to your Blogroll increases relevance. You qualify to display a USLaw Network badge.
Suggest changes to this blog's description or nominate another for inclusion. Register for updates.


Practice Area
Zip Code:

Contact a Lawyer Now!






0.0153 secs (new cache)