Litigation

Key Quotes From Caperton Opinion

By Charlie Hall

Below are some key quotes and topics from yesterday’s opinion in Caperton v. Massey. The 5-4 opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, ruled that a West Virginia Supreme Court justice could not rule on a case involving a litigant who spent $3 million to elect him.

The court found that in extreme circumstances (”The facts now before us are extreme by any measure”), election spending can create such a probability of bias by a judge that he or she must step aside. It added that no litigant should have a “disprpoportionate influence” in choosing the judge to hear his case. And it rejected concerns that Caperton would lead to a flood of appeals over recusal motions, saying that such disputes can be resolved through laws and regulation at the state level.

Here are excerpts from the full written opinion:

• It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ ?
• “This court. need not determine whether there was actual bias. There is a serious risk of actual bias when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case.”
• “The extraordinary contributions were made at a time when [Massey CEO] Blankenship had a vested stake in the outcome. Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when?without the other parties? consent?a man chooses the judge in his own cause.” 
• Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge?s recusal, but this is an exceptional case.
• Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor?s influence on the election under all the circumstances ?would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.?
• “The risk that Blankenship?s influence engendered actual bias is sufficiently substantial that it ‘must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’ … Applying this principle to the judicial election process, there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required Justice Benjamin?s recusal.”
• “Massey and its amici predict that various adverse consequences will follow from recognizing a constitutional violation here?ranging from a flood of recusal motions to unnecessary interference with judicial elections. We disagree. The facts now before us are extreme by any measure.”
• “Almost every State?West Virginia included?has adopted the American Bar Association?s objective standard: “A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.’ “
• ?The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here today.?
• “Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will thus be confined to rare instances.”

To learn more about the case, you can also visit Justice at Stake’s online Caperton resource page. To see earlier Gavel Grab postings on Caperton v. Massey, click here.

Full post as published by The Gavel on June 09, 2009 (boomark / email).