Labor & Employment Law

John Matyas was employed as a teacher and coach by the Chenango Forks Central School District. Following an altercation with a parent while coaching a baseball game, Matyas gave a statement to police that lead to a criminal charge being filed against the parent. After being acquitted of the criminal charge, the parent sued Matyas for malicious prosecution.

Matyas then asked the school district to provide for his defense and indemnification in the parent's action against him pursuant to Education Law §3811.* After the district rejected Matyas? request because he ?had not been acting in the performance of his duties as he had filed the criminal charge without involving school personnel,? Matyas filed a petition seeking a court order compelling the district to provide for his defense and for his indemnification for damages in the event the parent prevailed in the malicious prosecution action.

Supreme Court granted Matyas? petition, finding that he was acting within the scope of his duties because he contended that he had pressed charges to discourage the parent from disrupting future school events and this purpose serves the employer's interests. Such an analysis is used by courts to assess an employer's employer's vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of its employee on a respondeat superior theory.

The Appellate Division disagreed with the Supreme Court?s ruling, holding that the lower court had not applied the appropriate test in making its determination. It agreed with the school district that the correct test to be applied in adjudicating Matyas? claim that the district defend and indemnify him was whether the district?s decision was ?arbitrary and capricious? rather than whether the district vicariously liable as the respondeat superior. In such situations, the district?s decision should be ?set aside only if it lacks a factual basis? and thus could be found to be arbitrary and capricious.

As there were material facts in dispute concerning a number of critical elements that would be relevant in determining if the school district?s decision had a rational basis, the Appellate Division ruled that a hearing was necessary. It reversed the Supreme Court?s decision and remanded the matter to the lower court for its further consideration.

[In an appeal submitted to the Commissioner of Education by former members of a school board challenging the board's rejection of their request for their defense and indemnification pursuant to Education Law §3811(1) in connection with an action brought against them in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, the Commissioner annulled the board's decision. The Commissioner's decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume48/d15923.htm]

* Education Law §3811(1) imposes liability on a school district for the costs and expenses incurred by a teacher who defends a civil action "arising out of . . . the performance of his [or her] duties under this chapter [of the Education Law]." §§17 and 18 of the Public Officers Law, respectively, provided for the defense and indemnification of State officers and employees and the employees of political subdivisions of the State.

The Matyas decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_04343.htm

Full post as published by New York Public Personnel Law on June 11, 2009 (boomark / email).