Legal News

Supreme Court Draws Line on Judicial Campaign Contributions

By Brian Harris

In a prior post, we discussed the U.S. Supreme Court?s grant of certiorari in Caperton v. Massey Coal Co. Inc.  On June 8, a 5-4 decision, the court held a majority opinion that at some point, campaign money becomes too much money to allow the successful candidates to sit in a case involving the interest of a contributor. 

What does this decision have to do with insurance bad faith litigation? The Supreme Court has now held that a civil litigant may own a procedural due process right to obtain the recusal of a judge who is the beneficiary of an unduly sized campaign contribution from the litigant?s opponent.  In Caperton, Massy Energy suffered a $50 million trial award against it, which was then reversed by the West Virginia Supreme Court.  A sitting member of the court considered to have cast the deciding vote, Justice Brent Benjamin, was the recipient of a multimillion-dollar campaign contribution from the chairman of Massy Energy.  Benjamin refused three times to recuse himself on motions made by Caperton?s lawyers.

In writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote,  ?trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.?  Kennedy also recognized that common law has developed to a point where circumstances other than a judge?s direct financial interest in a case before him could serve as the basis to require recusal. Thus, Kennedy wrote, a reviewing court was not required to decide whether a judge was actually influenced by surrounding fiscal circumstances, holding that less direct interests could require recusal as well. 

The Caperton opinion is not a blanket prohibition of judicial campaign finance, or a bright line rule requiring recusal for any instance of campaign contributions.   The contribution at issue in Caperton was ?an exceptional case.? Kennedy concluded that the $3 million contribution by Massey?s chairman to obtain for Benjamin his seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court exceeded the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters by 300%.   Thus, Kennedy found that Massey chairman played a  ?pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected,? which  ?created a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias.?  The court elected the probability standard in part because it felt that an inquiry into actual bias by a judge already placed under scrutiny would be difficult if not impossible.  The majority also held that there was nothing inconsistent about the probability approach inasmuch as the due process cause oftentimes ?has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias.?

Kennedy also noted a close temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the justice?s election and the pendency and disposition of the underlying litigation, and then reasoned, ?based on the temporal relationship that was reasonably foreseeable . . .  that the pending case would be before the newly elected justice.? 

Kennedy also referred State Judicial Codes and the American Bar Association?s Model Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon Two, which required judges to avoid ? impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.?

The ruling in Caperton v. Massey should encourage those involved in insurance bad faith litigation to consider whether there are any potential appearances of impropriety with respect to judicial campaign contributions, as there is now a recognized constitutional protection from such impropriety.

Charles Haddick
Dickie McCamey & Chilcote
http://www.dmclaw.com/

Full post as published by The Legal Intelligencer Blog on July 10, 2009 (boomark / email).