Legal Malpractice

Motions to Dismiss on "Documentary Grounds" and Legal Malpractice

By (Andrew Lavoott Bluestone)

Here is a case from Richmond County with an interesting twist.  Facts:  Mother gets into money trouble and faces foreclosure.  Daughter helps out and negotiates a mortgage to pay off the earlier debts and prevent foreclosure.  An attorney is "assigned" by the mortage company for the mother.  Later Mom comes to believe that the terms and fees of the mortgage have been misrepresented.  She stops paying and this action endues.

After being sued, she third-parties the attorney.  Now he, as a third-party defendant moves to dismiss.

"In support of his motion to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), attorney Bellini maintains that the factual allegations in the third-party complaint preclude the maintenance of a cause of action against him for breach of fiduciary duty. In this regard, Bellini purports to rely upon the allegations that: (1) it was the daughter, Elizabeth Giammarino, who was acting as the third-party plaintiff's attorney-in-fact; (2) the third-party plaintiff did not attend the closing; and (3) attorney Bellini never spoke to the third-party plaintiff prior thereto. On the basis of this "documentary evidence," Bellini contends that any cause of action against him for breach of fiduciary duty could only run in favor of Mrs. Giammarino's daughter, Elizabeth.

CPLR 3211(a)(1) provides that a party may move for the dismissal of one or more causes of action asserted against it on the ground of a defense founded upon documentary evidence. To succeed on such a motion, however, the documentary evidence that forms the basis of the defense must be such that it resolves all of the factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of plaintiff's claim (see, Scadura v. Robillard, 256 AD2d 567 [2nd Dept. 1998]). Thus, a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff's factual allegations, thereby conclusively establishing a defense to the action as a matter of law (see, Ruby Falls, Inc. v. Ruby Falls Partners, LLC., 39 AD3d 619 [2nd Dept. 2007]). Here, the third-party defendant has not met this burden.

The allegation that the daughter was acting under a power of attorney as her mother's attorney-in-fact does not conclusively establish the absence of a fiduciary duty between the third-party plaintiff and counselor Bellini. Accordingly, this fact, standing alone, will not support dismissal. "

Full post as published by New York Attorney Malpractice Blog on February 19, 2008 (boomark / email).