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An ?at-will? employee given fair notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to dismissal has received the due process required by the 14th Amendment

An ?at-will? employee given fair notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to dismissal has received the due process required by the 14th Amendment
Edward A. Biliski, v Red Clay Consolidated School District, USCA, 3rd Circuit, Docket No. 08-1742 [This decision is noted as "Precedential"]

Edward A. Biliski, a computer technician was employed by the Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Education. Terminated from his position following ?several performance? issues,* Biliski sued, contending the School District had violated his procedural right to due process when it dismissed him.

The District?s defense: Biliski was an ?at-will employee and did not enjoy a ?constitutionally protectable property interest in his job.?

The Third Circuit ruled that ?the process [Biliski] received comported with his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,? and decided that it was ?unnecessary to address whether Biliski possessed a property interest in his continued employment."

Biliski was ?under the impression? that he could only be fired for ?just cause.? However, said the court, his belief was based on information he was given by co-workers rather than the District.

As to the pre-termination steps taken by the District, the court noted that in the course of the District?s review of Biliski?s performance considered a ?15-page letter? he submitted incorporated copies of four of the disciplinary memos he received and ?his lengthy responses? to each of the memos.

Biliski in an effort to retain his employment with the District, contended, among other things, that other employees ?did worse things than he had done and got away with them,? that he did more work than anyone else, that he was joking when he refused to unload equipment because another employee said he should not do it because of his ?heart condition,? that he was so busy he completely overlooked an entire project, and that he had not read the e-mail instructing employees not to park in the fire lane.

The Federal District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Red Clay, finding that Biliski had no protectable property interest in his job because no statute limited his employer?s ability to fire him and citing Delaware precedent for the proposition that ?unilateral expressions of company policies that do not set out a definite term of employment, such as in an employee handbook, do not alter an employee?s at-will status.?

The Circuit Court affirmed the District Court?s ruling, holding that ?To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff?s federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.?

The court explained that in cases such as that brought by Biliski seeking to establish a procedural due process claim the plaintiff must demonstrate that ?(1) he or she was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment?s protection of ?life, liberty, or property,? and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ?due process of law.??

However said the court, citing Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, ?[t]o have a property interest in a job . . . a person must have more than a unilateral expectation of continued employment; rather, [he] she must have a legitimate entitlement to such continued employment.?

Accordingly, an at-will employee has ??no property interest? in [his or her] job sufficient to trigger due process concerns.?

In this instance the District?s policy with respect to suspension and dismissal of ?classified staff members? provided, in pertinent part, that:

1. No employee will be dismissed except for just and reasonable cause, and only after an investigation has been conducted and written and signed charges have been filed within the Board.

2. The Board, if it decides to proceed on the charges, will notify the employee in writing of the charges and will provide an opportunity for a hearing.

3. The Board, upon recommendation by the superintendent or designee, has the right to suspend an employee against whom formal charges have been filed, until such time as a decision has been rendered.

Applying ?the interest-balancing framework? that the Supreme Court established in Mathews v. Eldridge, [424 US at 333], to decide whether the totality of the administrative process Biliski received in connection with his termination, including the written presentation of his position to the formal decision-maker, satisfied the ?fundamental requirement of due process [, which] is the opportunity to be heard ?at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,?? the Circuit Court decided Biliski received constitutionally sufficient notice of the reasons underlying the District's decision to dismiss him and that the pre-termination proceedings provided to Biliski was constitutionally sufficient.

Considering the several Mathews v. Eldridge factors noted above as relevant here, the court said it was satisfied that Biliski received fair notice of the reasons for the District's action and was give an opportunity to be heard as to why the Board should not terminate his employment.

In other words, given the interests at stake here, Biliski received all the process that was due him.

* The District said that it had terminated Biliski because he had failed to meet an important deadline not withstanding being asked to so a ?number of times,? that he refused to undertake another task he was asked to complete, saying that it was ?someone else?s job,? and that he showed a ?lack of respect and attention? at a customer service training.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/081742p.pdf

Full post as published by New York Public Personnel Law on August 04, 2009 (boomark / email).