Education Law

Harrison and Harrison on the NCAA and Antitrust Law

Professor Jeffrey Harrison of the University of Florida Levin College of Law and Casey C. Harrison, a J.D./M.S. (Sport Science) candiate at the same school, have recently posted to SSRN an interesting working paper relating to the antitrust concerns of the NCAA, which they refer to as a "monopsony," a sole buyer in a market with multiple sellers (as opposed to a traditional monopoly, which would be a sole seller in a market with multiple buyers).  The working paper reviews several antitrust challenges that the NCAA has experienced and particularly takes the courts (including the Supreme Court) to task for failing to critically analyze the NCAA's primary justification for its anticompetitive practices--that the "amateur" character of the sport actually makes it more competitive than it would be if it were not an amateur pursuit.  This assumption is offered in the cases as the primary justification for the clear exploitation of top-talent players that results from compensating them far below their market value (i.e., through scholarships).  Among other things, the authors correctly point out that this assumption, as of yet, has no empirical support.  Very interesting read.  Here's the abstract and link to download: 

The Law and Economics of the NCAA's Claim to Monopsony Rights 

Jeffrey Lynch Harrison and Casey C. Harrison

This article considers the legal and economic implications of the NCAA monopsony power with respect to players in the two most financially lucrative college sports - football and basketball. The principal means of doing so is through the evaluation of three recent legal challenges to the NCAA. Those challenges are to limits on payments to players, limits on the number of players receiving payment, and the rights of players under scholarship with respect to payments for commercial use of their images. The focus is on two questions. First, under current interpretations of the antitrust laws, what would the likely results of these cases be if they reached a final substantive resolution based on the strict application of these interpretations? More generally, what are the limits to the NCAA's use of monopsony power? The second question is whether there should be liability under the antitrust laws. This is a more complex question with the answer depending, in part, on whether the antitrust laws are to be applied to affect allocative or distributive outcomes.

Full post as published by Edjurist on September 15, 2009 (boomark / email).