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: Wall Street Law BlogTime confirms Bryan Burrough's Bear Stearns article as nonsense (GREATEST HITS))
By Brett D. Sherman
VANITY NOT FAIR - Magazine rushed irresponsible "investigative report"
BY BRETT D SHERMAN; WALL STREET LAW BLOG
"Instead of evidence there's just pure speculation. 'Where there's smoke, there's fire,' might be a nice sound bite but its not evidence. Before we unleash the hounds of war on rumor mongers, shouldn't we require more than this?" Dealbreaker.com
PART ONE, INTRODUCTION
"Bringing Down Bear
Stearns" - which appears in the August 2008 edition of Vanity Fair
Magazine - is supposed to be a work of serious journalism.
Instead of the crisp feel of hard news, however, writer Bryan
Burrough's article comes across as a polished, slick page-turner. Allusions to "shadowy"
conspiracies, corporate sabotage, and a complicit media abound. However,
Burrough's near complete omission of actual evidence to support his story
should consign "Bringing Down Bear Stearns" to
the realm of pulp fiction.
With an appealing film
noir style potboiler about the fall of Bear Stearns, Vanity Fair and Bryan
Burrough dispensed misinformation (sometimes called propaganda) to an unwitting
public. By creating a false perception of "events" that may never have
happened and almost certainly did not bring down Bear Stearns, VF and
Burrough dangerously manipulated the truth. Without objectively
verifiable facts, without a reasonable number of reliable sources, and without
better explanations of how Burrough's
villains wrought supposed
mischief, there is nothing in the article to make Burrough's "suggestions" credible.
Still, Vanity Fair
published the piece like it was gospel. The writing, based on
innuendo and rumor rather than on facts, was irresponsible. The
publishing was equally so. "Bringing Down Bear Stearns" is
dangerous because it portrays one man's theories as truths. Without a
whole lot more evidence, Vanity Fair probably should not have published
the article at all. In the alternative,
VF could have published the article with disclaimers about the lack of
corroboration for Mr. Burrough?s hypothesis.
The magazine made the indefensible choice to present ?Bringing Down Bear
Stearns? as hard news.
PART TWO:
BURROUGH?S MYTHICAL THREE-HEADED MONSTER
The article is the work of
Bryan Burrough (co-author of the classic
business expose Barbarians at the Gate). The basic idea of the VF article is
that, between March 10 and March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns may have been
the unwitting victim of a lightning-fast knockout by a three-headed
monster.
First, Burrough points to an unidentifiable cartel of ruthless
financiers who may have successfully pulled off a secret plan to
destroy Bear Stearns through a combination of aggressively
spreading rumors about alleged liquidity problems at Bear
Stearns while they were shorting Bear Stearns stock on a presumably
massive scale. We're talking James
Bond villains, secret mountain hideaways, and a plot to rule the
world. Okay, I may be exaggerating - but not by much.
In Burrough's words, many
believe there was "a malicious attack by so-called short sellers, the
Vultures of Wall Street, who bet that a firm's stock will go down."
Interestingly, Burrough fails to point out to Vanity Fair readers
what short-selling is, or that shorting is a perfectly legal and important
hedging strategy. It is not even remotely a stretch to say that
short-selling is a crucial component of everyday Wall Street
trading. Firms like Bear Stearns are (or were) shorted every
day. Moreover, Bear Stearns itself engaged in short-selling on a vast
scale and made a lot of money loaning shares to short-sellers.
If short sellers did illegally bring down Bear Stearns, why
does "Bringing Down Bear Stearns" fail to ever touch
on what the alleged illegal activity actually was and how it was
accomplished? Instead, Burrough - a talented writer - implies that all
short-selling is evil . Burrough also
uses his skilled pen to convey the impression that he believes ?the
short-selling conspiracy? is fact
without devoting even a sentence to explaining the facts behind the alleged
conspiracy. Just what happened and when?
Burrough can?t help us out there.
Cryptically, Burrough sums
up by telling the reader that the short-selling conspiracy "theory is
surprisingly difficult to prove..." Why is it difficult to
prove? What type of evidence is required. Just what are you saying specifically Mr.
Burrough? Without any answers, the writer simply moves
on, leaving this reader thoroughly confused.
Though Mr. Burrough apparently is comfortable discussing short-sellers without at least a rudimentary definition of what short-sellers do, I am not. Please forgive the digression, but here is Sherman's short lecture on short-selling.
It is the act of selling shares you don't actually own because you are betting that the share price will fall. In a winning short-sale, you borrow shares you don't actually own from institutions like Bear Stearns, and sell them at today's price. If the price does go down, then your bet was right. You buy an equal amount of shares at the lower price, return them - called covering your short - and the spread between your sell price and the later lower buy price, minus the cost of borrowing the shares, is your profit.
Villain number two in Burrough?s rogues? is financial news network
CNBC. According to Burrough, CNBC drove Wall Street into a
frenzy the week of March 10 by near-constant reporting of a
rumored liquidity problems at Bear Stearns - a rumor that Burrough paints
as unquestionably false without much explanation outside of his (or Bear's) oft-repeated
mantra that Bear Stearns had $18 billion in cash reserves. Burrough
claims that CNBC's reporting was a huge factor in scaring banks and
other financial institutions into pulling assets from Bear Stearns and, by
week's end, refusing to extend Bear the credit the firm needed to stay in
business.
It is preposterous to
blame CNBC for the end of Bear Stearns. A rumor of a liquidity
crisis at Bear Stearns (assuming the story is properly sourced) is a news
story worthy of reporting. The financial media reports rumors every
day of the week. More importantly, rumors are an important factor that
drive market activity on Wall Street every single day. With respect
to Bear Stearns, the primary activity during the week of March 10 was that
assets were pouring out of the investment bank. The story of a rapid
weakening of Bear's financial position - whether started by fact or
fiction - was certainly true by midweek. It was the type of news that
CNBC, given its central role in the financial media, had a duty to
report. For Burrough to imply that CNBC merits responsibility
for Bear's rapid death because the network reported on a dynamic,
evolving situation regarding Bear's liquidity (or lack thereof) tells
me that he lacks a fundamental understanding of the role of the
broadcast news media in America.
In a New York Post piece,
CNBC anchor Charlie Gasparino - singled out by Burrough as one of
the alleged rumor-mongers regarding problems at Bear Stearns
- responded strongly to the Vanity Fair story: "What we were talking
about [the week of March 10, 2008] was market activity. . . In those critical
hours we were reporting what was happening in the markets. What are we going to
do? Ignore it?" Gasparino continued: "If Bryan Burrough wrote
something substantively and factually accurate about the way we covered the
story there would be a problem [with CNBC's coverage], but he didn't. He was
incredibly sloppy." CNBC's Ticked at Vanity Fair, New York Post, July 11, 2008.
In the very
same New York Post article, even Bryan
Burrough (one would guess with a lawyer whispering in his ear) backtracks
from his attack on CNBC. Burrough now "says his intention wasn't to
place the blame on CNBC. 'The idea that CNBC did in Bear Stearns
[Burrough now claims] is ridiculous. ..' " Perhaps Burrough
needs to spend some time re-reading Vanity Fair article before making
such an indefensible claim.
To cite just
one example of Burrough's numerous attacks on CNBC, describes the alleged
fallout from an on-air exchange between CNBC's David Faber and Bear Stearns CEO
Alan Schwartz after Faber asked Schwartz about a trade that another firm
allegedly refused to complete with Bear Stearns (the trade eventually was
completed):
"It was a killer statement: Faber was saying, in
essence, that Bear?s status as a trader, the basis of its business, was in
question."
?You knew right at that moment that Bear Stearns was
dead, right at the moment he asked that question,? a Wall Street trader of 40
years told me. ?Once you raise that idea, that the firm can?t follow through on
a Trade, it?s over. Faber killed him. He just killed him.?
Does anyone who read the article honestly
believe that Bryan Burrough did not intend to place blame on CNBC?
The third and final pillar of Burrough?s ?Kill the Bear? triumvirate is the great
novation scandal. If you don't remember this part of Burrough's Vanity
Fair article, that is because Burrough pretty much lets the topic linger
until beyond the point in a very long magazine article where all but the
most attentionally- gifted readers toss the magazine aside and
start looking around the room for the remote control.
Late in his article, Burrough halfheartedly
(or maybe I was just tired) point a finger at investment bank Goldman Sachs and
hedge funds SAC Capital Partners and Citadel, for instigating a
"flood" of novation requests that gathered steam on March 11-12
(where investors looked to other investment banks to replace Bear Stearns as
counter-parties in certain transactions). The flood of novation requests
allegedly reached the point where Goldman itself (a rival of Bear in the
lucrative business area of Prime Brokerage), Deutchebank, and Credit Suisse
eventually felt that they had to refuse or delay decisions about whether to
accept orders for Bear novations.
According to Burrough,
Bear Stearns believes that this information was then intentionally leaked to -
you guessed it ? CNBC, in order to create a crisis of confidence in
Bear. To date, former Bear Stearns executives have done a fair
share of shouting about the novation issue as a deliberate attempt to
bring the firm down. There hasn't been any publicly disclosed evidence of
misconduct by Goldman or any other firm. Still, Burrough reports this part of the story as though Deep Throat had whispered
the information to him in a dark parking garage.
Late in his article, Burrough halfheartedly
(or maybe I was just tired) point a finger at investment bank Goldman Sachs and
hedge funds SAC Capital Partners and Citadel, for instigating a
"flood" of novation requests that gathered steam on March 11-12
(where investors looked to other investment banks to replace Bear Stearns as
counter-parties in certain transactions). The flood of novation requests
allegedly reached the point where Goldman itself (a rival of Bear in the
lucrative business area of Prime Brokerage), Deutchebank, and Credit Suisse
eventually felt that they had to refuse or delay decisions about whether to
accept orders for Bear novations.
According to Burrough,
Bear Stearns believes that this information was then intentionally leaked to -
you guessed it ? CNBC, in order to create a crisis of confidence in
Bear. To date, former Bear Stearns executives have done a fair
share of shouting about the novation issue as a deliberate attempt to
bring the firm down. There hasn't been any publicly disclosed evidence of
misconduct by Goldman or any other firm. Still, Burrough reports this part of the story as though Deep Throat had whispered
the information to him in a dark parking garage.
PART THREE: A
LESSON IN SPIN AND INNUENDO
As I read and re-read
"Bringing Down Bear Stearns," it sure seemed that the writer's
agenda was to exonerate the investment bank
from any substantial blame for its own demise. At the very
least, Burrough wanted to convince readers that there is a strong possibility
that Bear Stearns fell due to some premeditated conspiracy, with villians and
all.
After all, how many
magazines can you sell by suggesting that bad leadership, multiple scandals,
lousy finances, poor risk management, almost non-existent supervision, and
plain poor business practices were the chief causes of Bear's death? How
much buzz would a piece like that generate?
No need to answer.
Although Burrough devotes
a number of pages to descriptions of Bear's "self-inflicted
wounds" in 2007 and early 2008, and admits that Bear's missteps did
substantial damage to Bear's reputation and finances, Burrough is all too willing
to discount these issues, consigning them to the dustbin of pre-March 10, 2008
history. It felt to me like Burrough wanted readers to believe that Bear's
financial scandals, huge losses, change in leadership, etc., etc., etc., were
in the past, events Bear was watching through its rear view mirror as they
disappeared over the horizon into irrelevancy.
Consider the manner in
which Burrough described the optimistic outlook of the CFO of Bear Stearns
early on the morning of March 10, 2008:
"[A]s he drove in from his
Connecticut
home to the
glass-sheathed Midtown Manhattan headquarters of Bear Stearns, Sam Molinaro
wasn?t expecting trouble. Molinaro, 50, Bear?s popular chief financial officer,
thought he could spot the first rays of daylight at the end of nine solid
months of nonstop crisis."
What impression could
Burrough possibly intend to create in this passage other than that the bad times
were over for Bear Stearns? Following Burrough's imagery-rich description
of CFO Molinaro's conclusion that, on March 10, 2008, everything
at Bear Stearns was A-OK, most readers cannot help drawing the logical
next inference - since Bear Stearns was (allegedly)
financially healthy in March 2008, the company must have been
destroyed by the outside. Bear Stearns - the Vanity Fair article seems
to repeatedly shout - cannot be responsible for its own downfall.
But Mr. Burrough, were is
the evidence? Any evidence? A few anonymous sources, some creative
innuendo, and rank speculation are a poor substitute for objectively verifiable
facts and specific explanations about how key players (such as the evil, secret
short-sellers) could have possibly been responsible for
"Bringing Down Bear Stearns." For that matter, in a magazine
like Vanity Fair, shouldn't you have explained what short-selling even is? Do
your editors even know?
A crucial
fact - apparently unrecognized, ignored, or forgotten by Burrough
- is that Bear Stearns was in fact a very unhealthy investment bank during the week of March 10, as it had
been for a long time. For one thing, the firm still
held far too many poorly regarded, and totally illiquid, ?toxic? mortgage-backed
securities in its portfolio. Bear Stearns also was way
over-leveraged. Most reports put Bear's debt to equity ration at
somewhere between 30:1 and 35:1, the highest of any big investment bank on Wall
Street. (In layman's' terms an investment bank that is leveraged 30:1
means it has borrowed 30 dollars for
every one if its own dollars it spends).
The fact was
that, as a practical matter, Bear Stearns was insolvent the week of March 10,
2008. While Bear?s officers were busy
telling the public that nothing was wrong with its finances, the truth was that
Bear carried $29 billion of mortgage-backed securities and related investments
on the asset side of its balance sheet.
Bear certainly would have sold these securities to stay alive rather
than just throwing in the towel and disappearing into the JP Morgan Chase
behemoth. There were no buyers for the
portfolio. It was illiquid.
When there are
no buyers for a security a company needs to sell, the securities are
worthless. Therefore, the so-called $29
billion in assets was, in reality, worth nothing to Bear Stearns. JP Morgan certainly wanted no part of the toxic securities portfolio. Jamie Dimon has insisted time and again that
he would not have agreed to purchase Bear if it meant taking on the risky
securities. Eventually, the federal
government essentially bought the securities from JP Morgan in order to
facilitate the deal between Morgan and Bear Stearns.
Why is this
important? Because, during the week of
March 10, 2008, Bear Stearns had $29 billion
of worthless ?assets? listed on its
balance sheet. Subtract that $29 billion
and Bear Stearns is insolvent. Its senior executives and directors were
responsible for knowing that the $29 billion had nominal value. Officers
like Ace Greenberg and CEO Alan Schwartz misled the public, including Bear?s
shareholders, when they went on television or put out press releases to
(falsely) assure the public that Bear?s financial condition was healthy and
strong. Bear?s balance sheet was, in
reality, a disaster. There is a legal
term for this conduct ? we call it fraud.
PART
FOUR: BRINGING DOWN THE HOUSE OF BEAR
-CONCLUSION-
The
BigPicture.com draws the main point against conspiracy theorists
very well: "If your financial condition is so
precarious that rumors can bring you down, then it is the finances, and not the
rumors, that are to blame." The Big Picture; Who Killed Bear Stearns?
What killed Bear Stearns
is no mystery. Bear died because the investment bank itself
created an environment in which the banks with which it did business, and
upon which Bear Stearns relied for the capital it needed to run
its business, no longer had any faith in Bear Stearns. The
company began to seriously founder in June 2007 with the now infamous and possibly
criminal failure of two subprime dominated hedge funds. Bear
Stearns never recovered from the hit to its finances or, perhaps more
importantly, to its reputation from the hedge fund fiasco.
Thus, by March 2008, Bear Stearns found itself in very cold waters. The once-respected investment bank was sailing alone; the Titanic waiting for an iceberg. If the fatal blow had not come during the week of March 10, the odds are high that another disaster would have killed the firm another week. Bear Stearns was listing badly - undermined by scandal, massive financial losses, alleged criminal conduct, poor investment management decisions, questionable leadership, bad stock performance, and acts that put the company's integrity in question.
Full post as published by Wall Street Law Blog on December 15, 2009 (boomark / email).
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