Religion & Law

Hello All,

And many thanks to Michael for his thoughtful intervention.  I don't have much to add in response, I fear, save to observe that Michael appears to reject my premises, in which case there does not seem to be much room left for fruitful discussion of the merits of my argument itself. 

I take Michael to be saying, first, that there is no room for disagreement as to whether unborn human beings from conception onward are legally cognizable persons whom the polity is duty-bound to protect from abortions sought by their mothers.  The merits of the embedded claim -- the 'when protection-worthy personhood commences' claim -- of course I do not wish to contest, but the claim that there is no room for disagreement here strikes me as simply false.  At the very least it is false in the empirical and legal senses that (a) the polity (along with many a faith tradition) is in fact deeply divided on this, and (b) the courts have for the time being at least accordingly 'bracketed' the subject from state cognizance, leaving the matter to citizens in their individual capacities.  Michael and others, I am sure, do not accept the legitimacy of this decision on the part of the courts, or of the opposing sides on the merits.  And I admit to deep discomfort with that myself, being no fan of Roe.  But I am not willing to go so far as to say that we are presently amidst a civil war, akin to the religious wars of 16th and 17th century Europe, that is simply being waged by covert or otherwise eccentric means, which is what the claim that there is no legitimate room for disagreement or political 'settlement' on this right now seems to me to commit Michael to.  And that is the reason that I asked in my post that we suppose the question 'bracketed' for now as far as the state's cognizance is concerned, in order to consider the possible significance of intervening choice or causation arguments.

With respect to the other case of 'bracketing' -- that of state cognizance of sectarian difference -- here too Michael seems to me simply to be rejecting my premise, and here I feel less hesitancy about simply registering my flat rejection of his counter-premise.  I am well aware of our nation's past and present history of 'soft theism,' and I admit to finding it sweet and fuzzy; but I regard it nonetheless as in large part a simple compromise of principle which comes at a very high cost both to our fellow citizens who do not share the faith traditions that receive adulterated expression in 'soft theism,' and to our faith traditions themselves.  I for one am revolted by the adulteration in question, and would much rather my state regard faith as beyond its competence or ken.  Moreover, I believe that the state's 'soft theism' actually foments hostility to faith traditions by playing to the understandable suspicions of many who suspect that adherents of faiths are trying to exercise their wills over them.  And so again I find the strategy of bracketing to be the best, if not the only workable one here, just as in the abortion case.  And against that backdrop it seems to me that intervening decisions 'intervene' in a truly important way, in both cases. 

But again, I know I might be wrong.  Am muddling my way through here just as, I suspect, many of us are doing.

All best and thanks again,

Bob