Kentucky

This COA decision announced Mar. 5, 2010 and authored by Judge Combs arose from a trial out of Jefferson County and resulted in Judge Judith McDonald-Burkman being reversed.  The decision was styled Jospeh L. and Julie Hardesty vs. Scot-Bilt Homes and Kenneth S. Burns (No. 2008-CA-000564), not to be published and withdrawing an earlier opinion rendered Oct. 23, 2009.  Click here for the current opinion.

Although the case arose from a construction project and the implied warranties of habitability and alleged violations of the building code, the interesting part of this decision was that the trial judge was reversed for not granting the plaintiff's motion JNOV.  Specifically, the COA stated:

Burns disagrees and disputes at length each of the Hardestys? claimed errors. After a review of the arguments presented by the parties, the voluminous record and applicable law, we reverse the trial court. Although there was evidence presented to support Burns, it was simply inadequate substantively to support the verdict of the jury in this case. We are persuaded that the Hardestys were entitled to a JNOV.

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Appellate restraint dictates that we grant great deference to a jury verdict and the discretion of a trial court. However, we have indeed reversed jury verdicts when the evidence was lacking in sufficiency to sustain a verdict. Shreve v. Biggerstaff, 777 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. App. 1989). After our review of the records, we are persuaded that the evidence was so compelling against Burns that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict in his favor. The verdict was truly puzzling in light of the scant evidence offered to absolve Burns of liability. In an abundance of caution, the trial court allowed this case to proceed to a jury rather than entering a directed verdict. However, after the jury failed to return a verdict in compliance with the evidence, we conclude that the trial court erred in not granting a JNOV.

What I also found troubling at the trial court was the voir dire questioning into wholly inadmissible areas pertaining to the plaintiff's profession as lawyers.  As the COA noted -

During voir dire, the Hardestys? counsel informed the jury that Mr. Hardesty was a partner at the ?large? law firm of Stites and Harbison and that Mrs. Hardesty was an attorney with the Jefferson County Attorney?s office. Over the Hardestys? objection, the jury also learned that Mr. Hardesty is a member of the construction group in his firm. The Hardestys believe that the jury was tainted from the outset to their detriment. Although we agree that this evidence was wholly inadmissible on relevancy grounds, its erroneous admission would not suffice alone to warrant a reversal. We shall not speculate on the subjective impact  of such information. Therefore, our inquiry will focus solely on the substantiality of the evidence presented and the pertinent law.