Legal Malpractice

Hiring, Firing and Legal Malpractice

By (Andrew Lavoott Bluestone)

The matter of  Steinberg v. Schnapp, 2010 NY SlipOp 02991 relates the story of three lawyers, all of whom labored over a decedent's estate, and how the triumvirate fell apart.  Steinberg and Schnapp were retained to handle the estate by the executor who in this case was the third attorney.  Things fell apart rapidly, and, although unsaid, some mistakes were made.  Attorney 1 sues attorney 2 over fees, but does not sue the estate.  Why is this?

Judge Nardelli seems to have hit it on the head when he wrote "Inchoate in his complaint and the averments in support is a veiled concern that he might face a legal malpractice action for actions for which he was not responsible. Why a claim in quantum meruit against co-counsel would forestall such an action is left unsaid, but, in any event, the only issue before us with regard to the quantum meruit claim is whether Steinberg has raised any questions of fact as to Schnapp's argument that he has failed to state a cause of action.

At issue is the propriety of the motion court's dismissal of an attorney's claims under the theories of quantum meruit, as well as tortious interference with advantageous economic relationships. Both plaintiff Robert Steinberg and defendant Stanley Schnapp are attorneys admitted to practice in New York. Non-party Leon Baer Borstein also is an attorney, and was the preliminary executor of the estate of Isi Fischzang.

In the claim for tortious interference Steinberg alleges that he was fired because the "underlying client" (Borstein) had become dissatisfied with the delays in the probate of the estate, but that Schnapp fired Steinberg to shift the blame for the delays to Steinberg. Notably, Steinberg acknowledges that the "underlying client" could have requested his discharge "whimsically or capriciously or for any reason or for no reason, but the discharge would remain without cause.'" His concern that there is an intimation that his termination was "for cause" apparently provides much of the impetus for this litigation.

"[W]e are required to adjudicate [parties'] rights according to the unambiguous terms of the contract and therefore must give the words and phrases employed their plain meaning (Laba v. Carey, 29 NY2d 302, 308 [1971]). The plain language of all the written documents presented in this record evidences that Steinberg's client was the estate, and not Schnapp. Certainly, "[i]f a client exercises the right to discharge an attorney after some services are performed but prior to the completion of the services for which the fee was agreed upon, the discharged attorney is entitled to recover compensation from the client measured by the fair and reasonable value of the completed services" (Matter of Cooperman, 83 NY2d 465, 473 [1994] [emphasis added]). In this case Steinberg has sought to recover compensation for his services from a party who did not have any obligation to compensate him - his co-counsel - with whom he was clearly not in privity. There is not even a suggestion that the estate is an undisclosed principal, in which case liability might attach to Schnapp, under time-honored principles (see e.g. Ell Dee Clothing Co. v. Marsh, 247 NY 392, 397 [1928])."

Full post as published by New York Attorney Malpractice Blog on April 15, 2010 (boomark / email).