International Law

Constitutional Court Copyright Decision

By Karl-Friedrich Lenz

A decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on a copyright question was published a couple of days ago.

That decision is about the question whether the compensation system for private copies extends to computer printers.

In Germany, there is an exception from copyright for private use. The main reason for that is that it would be impossible anyway to monitor private copying, barring unconstitutional intrusion into the privacy of all citizens.

In return, makers of equipment suited for copying have to pay a levy for each unit sold. These funds are distributed to authors over collection societies.

The plaintiff, a collection society, wants printers included in the system. The German Federal Court of Justice decided in December 2007 that they are not.

Now the Federal Constitutional Court finds that unconstitutional and has annulled that decision. The Federal Court of Justice will have to decide again.

The main reason is that the Federal Court of Justice failed to adequately address European law.  While the Federal Court of Justice wants to limit the compensation to cases of reproducing printed texts and exclude printing of electronic data, Article 5 Number 2 a) of the 2001 Copyright Directive might suggest deciding otherwise.

At first glance, printing an electronic text on a printer has exactly the same result as copying the printed page on a photocopier. It would seem to be difficult to deny that the results are at least “similar”, which would trigger “fair compensation” under the Directive.

In the view of the Constitutional Court, that question should have been referred to the European Court of Justice. Failing to do so violates the plaintiff’s constitutional right to have his case decided by the judge determined by law (Article 101 of the German Constitution).

The other reason, which is only obiter dictum, is based on Article 14 of the German Constitution.

The Court cites earlier decisions and holds again that copyright law must guarantee a fair compensation for the author. Excluding a whole class of authors (those who publish only in electronic form) from this compensation does not seem to be compatible with that requirement.

And the last paragraph of this judgment is most interesting for me. I reproduce it here and provide a translation, before offering some comment.

cc) Weiter argumentiert der Bundesgerichtshof, anders als bei Druckwerken liege bei digitalen Vorlagen häufig eine Einwilligung des Berechtigten in die Vervielfältigung vor.  Eine neuere Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs (Urteil vom 29. April 2010 – I ZR 69/08 -, juris, Rn. 33 f.) deutet das entsprechende Verhalten digitaler Urheber als schlichte Einwilligung.  Eine solche ließe lediglich die Rechtswidrigkeit einer urheberrechtlichen Vervielfältigungshandlung entfallen; die Regelungen der §§ 53, 54a, 63a UrhG a.F. blieben anwendbar.  Die Annahme verbreiteter rechtsgeschäftlicher Einwilligungen lässt jedenfalls offen, warum zum einen den Urhebern in Fällen fehlender Einwilligung keine Vergütung zukommen, zum anderen aber die unterstellte Einwilligung in die Vervielfältigung zugleich einen Verzicht auf jegliche Vergütung enthalten soll.  Eine solche Annahme begegnet im Hinblick auf die verfassungsrechtlich gebotene grundsätzliche Zuordnung des vermögenswerten Ergebnisses der schöpferischen Leistung an den Urheber (vgl.BVerfGE 31, 229 <240 f.>) erheblichen Bedenken.

(My translation): The Federal Court of Justice further argues that in contrast to printed works electronic originals are in many cases covered by a consent of the copyright holder for reproduction. A new decision of the Federal Court of Justice sees digital authors’ relevant actions as a simple consent. Even this consent would only remove the illegality of the reproduction under copyright; the compensation rules of the German Copyright Law would still be applicable. Assuming consent by legal act in this way does not explain why authors who don’t declare consent should not be compensated, nor why the assumed consent to reproduction should also contain a renouncement of any compensation. Such an assumption is highly problematical from the point of view of Constitutional Law, which requires that in principle the monetary results of the author’s creative effort are paid out to him.

The “new decision” referenced here is the Google case I discussed earlier this year. In that post, I wrote:

“Such legislation would need to address why Google gets away with using other peoples? works without compensation, while use for personal purposes or for inclusion in a school text book triggers compensation. In the latter case the German Federal Constitutional Court actually insisted as a matter of human rights on that compensation. Why a small publisher of school textbooks needs to pay while Google with its billions of profit gets all content for free is not easy to explain.”

I kind of like the fact that the German Constitutional Court, who actually decides about these matters, seems to ask just about the same question here.

Full post as published by Lenz Blog on September 24, 2010 (boomark / email).