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Definition of a police officer

Definition of a police officer
Rossi v Metropolitan Trans. Auth., App Div, 249 A.D.2d 307

After the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority [MTA] and the Long Island Rail Road [LIRR] initiated a ?no fare - police ride program,? a dispute arose over the definition of a police officer.

Although the definition of ?police officer? set out in Section 1.20(34) of the Criminal Procedures Law is frequently used to make this determination, the Appellate Division found that it was not the controlling provision of law in this instance.

The police ride program was intended to encourage police officers to use public rail transportation to go to and from work. The theory was that allowing the officers to travel free would result in an enhanced visible presence of uniformed police personnel on MTA and LIRR trains and thereby serve to deter crime.

Uniformed personnel of New York City?s Fire Department?s Bureau of Fire Investigation, however, were not designated as eligible to participate in the ?police ride program? by either MTA or LIRR. They objected, contending that they were police officers and thus MTA and LIRR had to deem them eligible for their police ride program.

The free ride program was created in accordance with Section 1266.4 of the Public Authorities Law, which did not define the term ?police officer.? The fire marshals contended the agency should then rely on the definition of police officer in Section 1.20(34) of the Criminal Procedures Law, which would include fire investigators.

A State Supreme Court justice agreed, holding that excluding fire investigation personnel from the program was arbitrary and capricious. But the Appellate Division reversed the lower court?s determination on appeal.

The Appellate Division pointed out that the definition of police officer in Section 1.20(34) was expressly limited to the use of that term for the purposes of the Criminal Procedures Law. The court said that if the Legislature intended for that definition, or some other definition, to be followed for the purposes of implementing Section 1266.4 of the Public Authorities Law, it would have said so.

To illustrate the point, the court noted that this was exactly what the Legislature did when it enacted Section 58 of the Civil Service Law and Section 835.7-a of the Executive Law - it defined the term ?police officer? for the proposes of the provisions of those Sections.

For example, Section 58 of the Civil Service Law deals with the requirements for appointment to certain police officer positions. It declares that the term ?police officer? for the purposes of implementing Section 58 does not include a sheriff, under-sheriff, commissioner of police or chief of police as well as the incumbents of certain other positions holding titles which are police officer positions within the meaning of Section 1.20(34) of the Criminal Procedures Law.

The Court concluded that because the Legislature failed to define the term ?police officer? in Section 1266.4, MTA and LIRR were empowered to define the term. Finding that the definition of ?police officer? as determined by MTA and LIRR was not irrational, it vacated the lower court?s order.

Full post as published by New York Public Personnel Law on September 15, 2009 (boomark / email).