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By stan_sipple

Missouri Supreme Court with Justice Price dissenting, reverses defendant's conviction for statutory rape and sodomy because the State introduced other crimes evidence in the testimony of a child who testified the defendant assaulted the same way the defendant allegedly assaulted the victim. The State may not use evidence of other crimes to corroborate a victim's story. State of Missouri, Respondent v. Shane A. Vorhees, Appellant. : SC88553"(Trial courts may not use) the criteria of logical and legal relevance as a loophole for evading the general ban on propensity evidence. A finding of legal and logical relevance will never provide a basis for the admission of prior criminal acts evidence for the purpose of demonstrating a defendant's propensity." State of Missouri, Respondent v. Donald J. Ellison, Appellant.: SC88468slip opinion at 9. Propensity evidence, although logically relevant, is unconstitutional because it "violates [the] defendant's right to be tried for the offense for which he is indicted." State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. banc 1992) at 311. Because signature modus operandi evidence is actually just propensity evidence by another name, the legal or logical relevance of such evidence is irrelevant to its admissibility.
Despite the subjective and sometimes problem-ridden nature of victim testimony in rape cases, the perceived need for corroborative evidence does not justify abrogating the constitutionally-protected right of a defendant to be tried solely on the offense charged.
Evidence of prior bad acts, regardless of the degree of their similarity to the acts in the charged case, may not be admitted to corroborate victim testimony. Should evidence of those prior acts be admissible under an already-established exception, such as motive, common scheme or plan, identity, the absence of mistake or accident, or for impeachment, then the admission of that evidence does not offend the constitution. See, generally, Sladek, 835 S.W.2d at 311 (discussing the five exceptions in the context of a defendant's constitutional right to be tried for the offense for which he is indicted). The state did not put forth any such legitimate purpose for the prior acts testimony offered in this case.
In invalidating the signature modus operandi corroboration exception, this Court acts in conformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence governing corroborative evidence. Professor Imwinkelried, in his treatise Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, explains that "[c]orroborating evidence is merely evidence that confirms other evidence of a fact.... Any similar uncharged act generally corroborates in the sense that the act shows the defendant's propensity toward that type of crime and thereby increases the likelihood that the defendant committed the charged act. But that is precisely the theory of logical relevance forbidden by Rule 404(b) [the federal prohibition against other crimes evidence]. That 'corroborative' use of uncharged misconduct would be a patent violation of Rule 404(b). If 'corroboration' were a separate 'exception' to the exclusionary rule, that exception would swallow the rule." Imwinkelried Uncharged Misconduct Evidence at section 6:05 (1996).
This Court's decision also is consistent with the law of most other states. The vast majority of states do not recognize a signature modus operandi corroboration exception. Missouri's corroboration exception was far more liberal even than that recognized by a very small minority of states.In invalidating the signature modus operandi corroboration exception, Missouri brings its law in line with the federal and majoritarian state view and with its own constitutional principles.
Conclusion
The trial court erred in admitting evidence that on a prior occasion Vorhees committed a sexual offense with a minor that was similar to the charged offense. When offered to corroborate an alleged victim's testimony, evidence of a signature modus operandi ? like the propensity evidence in Ellison and its precedent cases ? violates the Missouri constitution's guarantee that a defendant will be tried only for the crime charged. To the extent that State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. banc 1993) and State v. Gilyard, 979 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. banc 1998) conflict with the holding of this case regarding the use of evidence of prior bad acts to corroborate testimony of an alleged victim, they should not be followed.

Full post as published by Showmeblawgs on March 02, 2008 (boomark / email).